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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

ANDREW GEORGE KISH, a/k/a
WILLIAM WALTER SNYDER,
Defendant-Appellant.

13004

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was originally charged with a codefendant.
Appellant was granted a separate trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury found appellant guilty of assault with intent
to commit robbery from which appellant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the verdict of the trial court
be affirmed.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter set forth.
During the hearing in which the court granted a motion to sever appellant's case from that of his codefendant,
appellant said: "That wasn't the main problem, you
know, I was trying to bring up, it was just the fact that
I wanted a jury trial." The court said, "All right, and you
are going to have a jury trial." Appellant replied, "Right.
So I am satisfied with that, then." (March 17, 1972, T.R.
14).
During appellant's trial, counsel for appellant moved
for a mistrial when counsel for the state indicated it might
call the codfendant as a witness. When the state indicated that it might not call the codefendant, counsel for
appellant said: "Well, if he is not called, I see no problem." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 15).
Before trial, appellant was given a voluntary statement form which contained a printed portion. He filled
it in and signed it. (March 17, 1972, T.R. 42-43). The
court sustained appellant's motion to suppress because
the facts did not shown that appellant read it or that it
was read to him. Part of the printed portion contained
a waiver of the right to presence of counsel (March 20
and 21, 1972, T.R. 3-4).
One witness was called who had not been endorsed.
The court allowed his testimony only to the extent that
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it laid a foundation regarding the security of the exhibits

held in the police office. (Supra at 121).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT HAD INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO
JUSTIFY APPOINTMENT OF SEPARATE
COUNSEL, IT DID NOT ERR.
Unless there is a conflict of interest or prejudice,
courts have allowed codefendants to be represented by
the same attorney and such representation has not been
held a denial of effective assistance of counsel per se. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "The sixth
amendment is not violated by joint representation of codefendants unless a conflict of interest or prejudice results
from such procedure." Fryar v. United States, 404 F. 2d
1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968). This court has indirectly so
held in the peculiar fact situation in Combs v. Turner, 25
Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 (1971).
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in State v. Andrews,
106 Ariz. 372, 476 P. 2d 673, 678 (1970), held:
"In order for assistance by counsel for an accused to be impaired by representation of the same
attorney, actual conflict must in fact have existed
or be inherent in the facts of the case from which
a possibility of prejudice flows."
The facts of the case must be analyzed to decide whether
an actual conflict exists. In McHenry v. United States,
420 F. 2d 927, 928 (10th Cir. 1970), the court held:
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"So, too, codefendants may have effective representation by a single attorney under circumstance that negative a conflict of interest. Each
issue must be considered under the totality of circumstances that prevailed during all the pre-trial
and trial proceedings."
The record in the present case does not support the
contention that between the codefendants there existed
an actual or potential conflict of interest, or a possibility
of prejudice. Before trial, the lower court held a hearing
on March 17, 1972, during which the court granted a motion to sever appellant's case from that of his codefendant,
Mr. Vincent. After assuring appellant that he and Mr.
Vincent would not be tried at the same time, the court
asked appellant if he still claimed relief under the motion
for other counsel. Appellant said: "That wasn't the main
problem, you know, I was trying to bring up, it was just
the fact that I wanted a jury trial." The court said, "All
right, and you are going to have a jury trial." Appellant
replied, "Right. So I am satisfied with that, then."
(March 17, 1972, T.R. 14).
During appellant's trial, counsel for appellant had a
"visceral feeling" that there would be a conflict of interest if Mr. Vincent were called as a witness. Counsel for
appellant said, "I would have to move that if Mr. Vincent
is called as a witness that a mistrial be declared inasmuch
as I have confidential information." Counsel for the state
indicated that Mr. Vincent may not be called. Counsel
for appellant then said, "Well, if he is not called I see no
problem but if he were called at that point I would re-
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quest permission at that point to renew my motion for a
mistrial." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 15). Mr. Vincent
was not called as a witness.
No attempt was made on behalf of appellant to bring
forth facts upon which the lower court could have reason
to substitute separate counsel for appellant. Both times
that the issue of conflict between codefendants was presented to the court as stated above, either appellant himself or his counsel was satisfied with the court's solution.
Since the record is devoid of evidence it is improper to
contend that the court erred in failing to substitute separate counsel when in fact appellant failed to show the
court why it should appoint substitute counsel.
Counsel for appellant contends that the reason he
was unable to argue and expound upon the reasons for
the appointment of separate counsel was because of his
concern that anything he might say to the court "might
in fact be harmful or deleterious to the cases of one or the
other of his two clients." (Appellant's Brief at p. 24).
Counsel's reasons for believing there was a potential conflict of interest were not part of the record. Counsel for
appellant stated in Appellant's Brief that the sources of
potential conflict were largely based (1) on concern over
upsetting negotiations for Mr. Vincent (P. 18-20), and
(2) on what Mr. Vincent might say if called as a witness
(P. 20-21). Both of these concerns are more properly
described as trial tactics and in absence of clear error are
generally not subject to appellate review. In any event,
these concerns should have been raised in the lower court.

If the lower court does commit error, this court is competent to correct such error. However, fear that a lower
court might err should not justify a defendant in refraining from presenting his best case to that court.

POINT II.
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A
COURT IMPOSE IDENTICAL SENTENCES
WHEN ONE CODEFENDANT PLEADS
GUILTY TO A LESSER CRIME AND THE
OTHER CHOOSES A JURY TRIAL ON THE
GREATER.
The court in Cuzick v. State, 4 Ariz. App. 455, 421
P. 2d 537, 538 (1966), held, "There is no requirement
that the court impose identical sentences upon codefendants." In this case, appellant, a codefendant, pled guilty
to first degree burglary and was sentenced to a prison
term of not less than five nor more than eight years.
Later, the st.ate amended the information to second degree
burglary, to which the other codefendant, his brother,
pied guilty and received a sentence of not less than four
and one-half nor more than five years imprisonment.
The court held:
"The appellant could not complain ( 1) if the
prosecutor failed to prosecute his brother, or (2)
if a jury convicted him and acquitted his brother,
or (3) if identical sentences were not imposed on
both." Id.
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In the present case, appellant was given the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser charge (March 17, 1972,
T.R. 4). Appellant chose a jury trial and was convicted.
Since there is no requirement that identical sentence be
imposed upon codefendants, the fact that Mr. Vincent
pled guilty to a lesser crime really has no bearing on appellant's lawfully imposed sentence.

POINT III.
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS MADE BY
AN ACCUSED WHICH ARE NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
MIRANDA, MAY BE ADMISSIBLE TO IMPEACH THE ACCUSED'S CREDIBILITY.
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), a defendant allegedly made statements at a police interrogation. The evidence did not show that the defendant was
warned of his right to appointed counsel before he answered the questions put to him. No question was raised
as to the voluntariness of the statements. The statements
were not used in the prosecution's case in chief but were
used for purposes of impeaching defendant's credibility.
In upholding the use of the statements for impeachment
purposes the court said: "The shield provided by
Miranda cannot be prevented into a license to use perjury
by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances." Id. at 226. Thus, it
is clear that inconsistent statements made by an accused
may be used for impeachment purposes.
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In the present case, appellant stated that he would
write a statement. He was given a form for making a
voluntary statement which contained a printed portion.
The printed portion was not read t.o the appellant; he
was only t.old t.o fill in the blanks and sign it. Appellant
wrote for about fifteen minutes and then signed it (March
17, 1972, T.R. 42-43). The court sustained appellant's
motion t.o suppress because the facts did not show that
appellant had read the printed portion or that it was read
t.o appellant. Part of the printed portion contained a
waiver of the right t.o presence of counsel (March 20 and
21, 1972, T.R. 3-4). Since appellant raises no issue as t.o
the voluntariness of his statement, since the statement
was never used, and since the Supreme Court has upheld
the use of prior statements for impeachment purposes,
there was no error on the part of the lower court when it
stated:
"[l]t may be that upon a proper presentation
the District Att.omey can use that for impeachment purposes and you may stand forewarned of
that fact." (March 20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 4-5).
POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO MATERIAL PREJUDICE
RESULTING FROM THE MANNER IN
WHICH THE NAMES OF THE WITNESSES
WERE ENDORSED ON THE INFORMATION.
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This court in State v. Redmond, 19 Utah 2d 272, 430
P. 2d 901, 904 (1967), stated:
"Courts have consistently held that the endorsement of additional names of witnesses on the
Information even during trial rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court, and material prejudice
must be shown before it constitutes reversible
error."
In the present case there was no showing of material
prejudice. Counsel for appellant objected to the omission
of certain names from the amended information (March
'20 and 21, 1972, T.R. 12). Counsel for the state reminded
counsel for appellant that the names were included in the
bill of particulars. The court granted appellant's motion
(Supra at 14). However, one name was left off and counsel for appellant objected (Supra at 120). The court
overruled the objection because the only purpose of calling the witness was to lay a foundation regarding the
security of the exhibits held m the police office (Supra
at 121). Appellant has not shown any prejudice, and
certainly no material prejudice, in the manner in which
the names of the witnesses were endorsed on the information.
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CONCLUSION
The facts contained in the record of the lower court
show no error in failing to substitute counsel or prejudice
in the manner of endorsing witnesses. It is also clear that
the law does not require a codefendant to receive an
identical sentence or that inconsistent statements be excluded for purposes of impeachment. Wherefore, the conviction of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

